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Chapter 12
The Promise of Deﬁned Ambition Plans:
Lessons for the United States
A. Lans Bovenberg, Roel Mehlkopf, and Theo E. Nijman

This chapter explores deﬁned ambition (DA) schemes that provide variable annuities to participants. These schemes are based on occupational
pension schemes in the Netherlands in which participants—rather than
an external sponsor—bear the balance sheet risks of pension funds.
These Dutch schemes have evolved from traditional deﬁned beneﬁt
(DB) schemes with employers as external risk sponsors. The government
of the United Kingdom is looking at DA schemes as one of the ways to
strengthen occupational pension provision in the UK (Department for
Work and Pensions 2013). Also some public sector pension schemes in
the United States are considering risk sharing among participants as a
way to reduce plan costs and risks imposed on taxpayers as external
risk sponsors (e.g. Novy-Marx and Rauh 2013). Our analysis addresses
the key issues associated with a move from the DB design towards DA
schemes.
The chapter is structured as follows.1 First, we describe the Dutch
pension system, followed by an investigation of the major strengths of
Dutch occupational schemes. Next, we analyze the major weaknesses
of Dutch occupational systems as revealed by the ﬁnancial crisis. These
weaknesses originate in the legacy of the DB design in terms of (1) communicating and setting risk exposures; (2) valuing annuities; and (3) accruing
new beneﬁts and determining pension contributions. These weaknesses
led to proposals for DA schemes. We then describe the key features of
these schemes and describe the Dutch policy debate on occupational
pensions in general and DA schemes in particular. This includes a review
of various obstacles to the actual implementation of DA plans. Subsequently, we draw lessons for the United States by comparing DA schemes
with mainstream deﬁned contribution (DC) schemes. Finally, we offer
conclusions on the promise of DA for the United States, including for
public sector plans.
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Dutch Occupational Pensions
Three-pillar system
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The ﬁrst is a pay-as-yougo public pension scheme. This Beveridge-type public system provides a
uniform, ﬂat pension to all residents at a level that is related to the minimum
wage rather than individual earnings. Most other continental EU countries,
by contrast, feature Bismarckian earnings-related public pensions. Accordingly, compared to other EU governments, the Dutch government provides
only a relatively small part of pension income for workers who earn middle
and higher incomes. If these workers want to maintain their standards of
living in retirement, they need additional pension provisions. This is where
the second pillar of pension provision (i.e. occupational pensions) enters
the picture. In contrast to the ﬁrst pillar, the second pillar is earningsrelated, and it aims to maintain the standard of living of middle-class
workers during retirement. The third pillar consists of voluntary personal
pension provisions, which are tax-favored up to a ceiling. This last pillar is
especially important for self-employed individuals who lack occupational
pension provisions.

Occupational pensions
Our chapter focuses on the occupational pension schemes in the second
pillar. These are typically part of labor contracts negotiated between unions
and employers in collective labor agreements; employees are thus obliged to
participate in the negotiated pension scheme. As a result, occupational
schemes cover more than 90 percent of the labor force. These schemes
are funded, and the value of assets in the second pillar currently amounts to
about €1 trillion (140 percent of GDP).
Dutch pension funds are independent trusts with their own governance and administrative structures. The governing board of a pension
fund has traditionally consisted of equal representatives of employers
and unions, although recently retirees and independent specialists have
also been able to become board members. These representatives act as
ﬁduciary trustees. Industry-wide pension funds arrange pensions for
workers in a speciﬁc sector of the economy. These sectoral funds own
more than two-thirds of the assets in the second pillar, and account for
more than 80 percent of active participants. A company can opt out of an
industry fund only if it offers a better pension plan than the plan offered
by the sectoral fund.2 This mandatory participation of ﬁrms in sectoral
arrangements contributes to the high coverage of occupational pensions
in the Netherlands.
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Beneﬁt entitlements in terms of annuities
The occupational plans seek to generate a speciﬁc lifetime income stream
during retirement, and property rights are deﬁned in terms of a (deferred)
annuity. Years of service and a reference wage typically determine the
beneﬁt entitlement level. In the past, the reference wage was the ﬁnal
rate of pay, but over the last decade, most funds have moved to careeraverage schemes. In the latter schemes, entitlements to deferred annuities
accrue based on a percentage of the average wage level during the career.
These schemes typically aim at an annuity level of about 75 percent of
average pay (including the ﬂat public beneﬁt) after 40 years of service.
The beneﬁt accrual (in terms of annuity level) is uniform across age
groups. Hence, if the aim is to provide 75 percent of average pay after a
working career of 40 years, the annual accrual rate is 1.875 percent (75/
40). The uniform accrual rate of annuity units implies that beneﬁts are
backloaded, because the time value of money implies that the value of the
(deferred) annuity (as a percentage of the wage) rises with age. Industry
funds charge the same premium rate for the annuity units irrespective of
age. Hence, ﬁrms with a younger workforce subsidize ﬁrms with an older
workforce.3
The goal is to index the deferred annuity to the development of contractual wages during the accumulation phase. Some funds also aspire to link
annuities to the development of contractual wages during the payout phase.
Other funds aim to provide cost-of-living adjustments during the decumulation phase.

Payout conditional on performance
The aspired annuity levels represent the plans’ ambitions rather than a
guarantee. That is, a pension fund aims to index the pension rights,
but the bonus payments are conditional on the ﬁnancial performance of
the fund. Not only is indexation conditional on fund performance, but
also the nominal (or ‘base’) pension can be cut if the assets of a fund fall
below the value of the nominal liabilities (i.e. the value of the annuities
excluding indexation).4 Dutch solvency regulation requires that a funding shortage (calculated on the basis of the value of nominal liabilities) is
resolved within a three-year period in expectation. The length of the
recovery period has temporarily been increased to ﬁve years in the
aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. In calculating the scope for
recovery, funds can use expected returns on assets. Hence, risk premiums on risky assets are assumed to contribute to the potential for
recovery. But funds are not allowed to increase mismatch risk if they
are in a recovery program.
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Nominal liabilities computed with market interest rates
For the purpose of solvency regulations, Dutch pension funds must calculate
nominal liabilities on the basis of the term structure of nominal interest
rates (based on European swap rates) published by the Dutch Central Bank.
This market-based valuation method, introduced in 2007, thus assumes that
nominal liabilities are guarantees.5 Before 2007, pension funds discounted
their liabilities against a ﬁxed discount rate of 4 percent. The introduction
of valuation on the basis of market interest rates did not have a substantial
effect on funding rates at the time, as market interest rates in 2007 were
close to 4 percent.

Strengths of Dutch Occupational Plans
This section explores the main strengths of Dutch occupational pension
schemes compared to mainstream DC schemes.

Advanced risk management and protection against
behavioral biases
Workers in the Netherlands are automatically enrolled in pension plans,
which reduces marketing and other transaction costs, and protects individuals against myopia and other behavioral biases. Such co-operative pension
plans allow individuals with limited ﬁnancial capabilities to delegate complex saving, investment, payout, and insurance decisions to professionals. In
fact, the plans assist individuals to properly exploit their long-run investment
horizons and to gain access to complex investment strategies at low costs.
Pension funds also manage interest-rate and inﬂation risk, seeking to
realize their ambition to index retirement income to wages and/or prices.
Hence the hedge portfolio is deﬁned in terms of income streams during
retirement. Indeed, the main risks (e.g. investment risk, inﬂation risk, and
interest-rate risk) are managed so as to hedge risks on behalf of households
while at the same time exploiting the risk premiums on various risk factors
by optimizing the trade-off between return and risk. This asset-liability
management thus results in liability-driven investment. More sophisticated,
illiquid, and long-term investments by institutional investors help to stabilize
ﬁnancial markets and facilitate macroeconomic stability.

Protection against agency issues
The board of trustees of a Dutch pension fund contracts out several ﬁnancial services to asset managers and other providers of ﬁnancial services.
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Accordingly, with the employer as a distribution platform, competition
occurs on a wholesale level rather than a retail level. By joining forces in a
professionally run co-operative pension fund, workers in effect strengthen
their buying power in ﬁnancial markets and markets for ﬁnancial services.
This also permits them to exploit scale economies and discipline commercial ﬁnancial service providers to act in the interests of pension fund members, who tend to lack sufﬁcient expertise to contract complex ﬁnancial
services.

Pooling of idiosyncratic longevity risk and
completion of ﬁnancial markets
In addition to addressing agency and governance issues, Dutch pension
funds reduce selection in longevity insurance through compulsory risk
pooling. This facilitates the pooling of idiosyncratic longevity risk, thereby
reducing the costs of providing lifetime income streams. Collective riskpooling not only combats adverse selection in insurance of idiosyncratic
longevity risk, but it also allows fund members to trade systematic risks that
are not (yet) traded in ﬁnancial markets. In particular, young members can
share in systematic longevity risks faced by older cohorts. To illustrate, if a
cohort lives longer than expected, the resulting lower funding rate harms
the indexation of the deferred annuities offered to younger cohorts. Moreover, by linking pension beneﬁts to the wages of workers, pension funds
allow retirees to share in the wage risks of workers.6

Weaknesses of Dutch Occupational Plans
The major weaknesses of Dutch occupational pension plans were exposed
by the ﬁnancial crisis. They relate to the legacy of a DB design with external
risk sponsors. A ﬁrst weakness involves the risk proﬁles of retirement
income. In particular, funds’ investment policies do not originate from
participants’ desired risk proﬁles. That is, the pension contract does not
allow much scope to tailor the risk proﬁle to the needs of different generations. A second main weakness concerns the valuation of pension rights.
This valuation is based on the ﬁction of guaranteed pensions, even though
pension funds in fact offer variable annuities whose actual value depends on
investment policy, funding rates, and the rules for distributing surpluses and
deﬁcits. Next, we investigate how the ambiguity surrounding risk proﬁles
and valuation gives rise to intergenerational conﬂicts about the investment
proﬁle of the fund and the ownership of the assets.
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Ambiguous risk proﬁles and liabilities for
communication and investment
Lack of risk-bearing capital
As the ratio of pensioners to workers rises due to aging and the maturation of
pensions systems, pension liabilities have increased compared to the premium base. As a direct consequence, large changes in contributions are
now required to absorb the risk of mismatch between assets and liabilities.
Indeed, for many companies, the risks of their DB pension schemes have
started to dominate those of the core business. These ﬁrms therefore no
longer wish to underwrite the risks of their pension funds. Another reason
why contributions can no longer absorb shocks is that contribution rates to
occupational pensions have reached rather high levels due to low interest
rates, increased longevity, and additional recovery contributions aimed at
reducing funding shortages (Figure 12.1). Moreover, volatile contributions
that are inversely related to the funding rates of pension funds impact the
economy in a pro-cyclical fashion. As a result of these developments, employers and workers supply less risk-bearing capital to pension funds in the form of
contributions that stabilize funding rates. Accordingly, participants must
supply more risk-bearing capital through pension rights that absorb mismatch
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Figure 12.1 Average total (employee plus employer) contributions to Dutch occupational pensions as percentage of gross wage income, 1980–2013
Source : CPB (2014).
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on the balance sheet of pension funds. Participants rather than contributors
have, in fact, become the residual risk bearers of pension funds.

Substantial mismatch risk due to macroeconomic shocks
Pensions funds’ increased ﬁnancial risks became quite apparent during the
ﬁnancial crisis, which generated a substantial mismatch between the funds’
assets and liabilities. Figure 12.2 displays the development of the average
nominal funding rate of Dutch pension funds during the last 25 years.7 Prior
to the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007, the average nominal funding rate
amounted to about 145 percent. The ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 caused the
average nominal funding ratio to decrease substantially to a low of about 90
percent in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009.
Three main factors contributed to the fall of funding rates. First, in
combination with the use of the term structure of nominal interest rates to
compute the value of nominal liabilities, the sharp decline in nominal
interest rates during the ﬁnancial crisis boosted the present value of nominal pension liabilities. Indeed most of the decline in the funding rate
between 2007 and 2011 can be attributed to lower nominal interest rates.
The second factor behind the drop in funding rates was lower mortality.
Following major healthcare reforms in 2001, retirees’ mortality rates
dropped more substantially than anticipated. Upward revisions of life
expectancy have depressed average funding rates by about 5 percent. The
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Figure 12.2 Average nominal funding rate of Dutch occupational pension funds,
1988–2013
Source : CPB (2014).
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ﬁnal factor affecting funding rates involves the asset side of the balance
sheet. In particular, the worldwide collapse of share prices in the immediate
aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis reduced asset values dramatically.
The rise in pension liabilities as a result of lower interest rates was not
sufﬁciently compensated by the increase in the value of bonds (or interest
derivatives) on the asset side of the pension balance sheet. This was because
the funds did not fully hedge nominal interest-rate risk after the 2007 move
to employ nominal interest rates in computing liabilities. On average, Dutch
pension funds hedge only around 45 percent of the nominal interest rate
risk on their liabilities through positions in nominal bonds and interest
derivatives. Moreover, there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree to
which funds have hedged interest rate risks. Additionally, funds differ in
how they deﬁne their liabilities for their own risk-management purposes,
even though the public supervisor uses the construct of nominal guaranteed
liabilities to compute funding rates. In particular, in the face of ﬂuctuating
(wage) inﬂation expectations, funds must choose which kind of income
liability to hedge: either a nominal pension beneﬁt or a (wage) indexed
pension income stream. In particular, short-term debt instruments allow
funds to take advantage of rising nominal interest rates if wage inﬂation
expectations increase so as to protect the real value of pensions. This
investment policy, however, leaves the fund vulnerable to the risk that falling
nominal interest rates will worsen the nominal funding rate, necessitating a
cut in nominal pension rights. In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, this
tension between hedging nominal and real liabilities has become especially
stark, depending in part on whether one believes that changes in nominal
interest rates are primarily driven by changes in real interest rates, or by
changes in expectations about inﬂation and the inﬂation risk premium.
As regards investment risk, various funds have also taken rather different
decisions. Indeed, supervisory authorities do not force pension funds to
match their nominal liabilities if capital buffers become low.8 The supervisory rules thus leave substantial discretion to the pension funds on how to
respond to low funding rates in terms of their investment risk. Some pension
funds chose to defend nominal pension rights by not only matching these
nominal obligations through hedging nominal interest-rate risk but also by
cutting back on investment risk. Other pension funds, by contrast, continue
taking investment risk in order to retain upside potential.

Insufﬁcient scope for tailor-made risk proﬁles gives rise
to intergenerational conﬂict
The trade-off pension funds face in setting their investment policies can
also be regarded as a trade-off between the interests of young and old
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participants. As many authors advocating life cycle investing have shown
(e.g. Bodie et al. 1992; Cocco et al. 2005), taking substantial investment risk
is more attractive for young participants than for retirees. Similarly, protecting nominal guarantees by hedging nominal interest rate risks is primarily in
the interest of the elderly. The current Dutch occupational pension plans
impose uniform investment and adjustments in pension rights (indexation
and cuts in nominal pensions) for all participants. This limits the scope to
attune risk exposure to the needs of various cohorts (Ambachtsheer 2013),
although intertemporal smoothing of shocks allows for limited age differentiation between the risk exposures of various generations (Boelaars et al.
2014). The limited scope for tailor-made risk proﬁles may lead to suboptimal risk proﬁles and result in intergenerational conﬂicts over the investment policy of the pension funds.

Nominal cuts of pensions in payment due to materialized interest-rate risk
Many pension funds that had deliberately chosen to continue to take mismatch risk at low nominal funding rates saw their nominal funding rates fall
below 100 percent when interest rates sank during the ﬁnancial crisis and the
subsequent Euro crisis. Most of these pension funds were unable to recover
from their funding shortage within the maximum period of ﬁve years without
cuts in nominal pension rights, including pensions in payment.
The biggest wave of cuts in pensions in payment occurred in 2013: in that
year, 68 pension funds (of 415) were required to cut nominal pension rights.
These cuts affected around 2 million active participants (who pay contributions), 1.1 million retired participants, and 2.5 million inactive participants
who neither paid contributions nor received beneﬁts.9 Figure 12.3 shows a
bar chart displaying the size of pension cuts. Around 2 million participants
faced a relatively large cut of 6 or 7 percent. A cut of 7 percent is observed
frequently because the Dutch government allowed pension funds to cap the
level of pension cuts in 2013 at 7 percent and defer the remainder to 2014.10
Most pension funds have been unable to provide (full) indexation in
recent years. Table 12.1 illustrates that actual indexation to retirees has
lagged indexation ambitions: on average, retirees have experienced a
decline of around 10 percent of their replacement rates as a consequence
of inadequate indexation. This decline is expected to grow because the
current low funding rates will not allow pension funds to provide full
indexation in the near future.

Inadequate communication about risks proﬁle
Pension funds in the Netherlands typically communicate to participants in
terms of nominal pension rights, but they are rather silent on future
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Figure 12.3 Number of participants affected by cuts in Dutch occupational pensions
in 2013
Source : DNB (2015).

table 12.1 Average indexation shortfall, 2008–14

Indexation ambition
Actual indexation

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

1.84
2.91

3.76
0.17

1.66
0.42

1.2
0.02

1.35
0.02

1.47
0.08

1.11
0.18

Source : DNB (2015).

indexation prospects and the possibilities of future cuts in nominal pension
rights. Communication to participants has not yet adapted to the new
reality of participants being the main risk bearers.11 Hence, the fact that
pension payouts could be cut came as an unpleasant surprise to many
pensioners and eroded the conﬁdence of active members. Table 12.2
shows that the percentage of people expressing ‘some or a lot of trust’ in
pension funds declined from 64 percent before the crisis to 42 percent after
the crisis.12

Pension funds aren’t ‘walking the talk’: incomplete investment policy
The cuts in pension payouts have made it clear that the pension contract
does not provide guarantees, even though pension funds continue to communicate in terms of nominal pension rights. Indeed, pension funds do not
‘walk the talk.’ Whereas they suggest that they supply ﬁxed annuities, they

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi

The Promise of Deﬁned Ambition Plans

225

table 12.2 Conﬁdence in pension funds, the government, banks, and
insurers (% of Dutch people that have some or a lot of conﬁdence)

Pension funds
Government
Banks
Insurers

2004 (%)

2006 (%)

2009 (%)

2011 (%)

53
37
32
32

64
42
37
37

44
45
25
18

42
41
34
20

Source : Van Dalen and Henkens (2011).

actually provide variable annuities because they continue to deliberately
take mismatch risk at low funding rates in the absence of the possibility of
raising contributions to make up funding deﬁcits. The ﬁnancial crisis thus
exposed a major weakness of the Dutch pension system: the ambiguity of the
risk proﬁles of future pension payments on account of incomplete investment policy, and a mismatch between the communicated risk proﬁle and
the funds’ investment policy. In particular, risk proﬁles are not speciﬁed and
communicated ex ante, and supervisory authorities do not force pension
funds to make their investment policies consistent with their communicated
risk proﬁles.
To address this weakness, pension funds would have to change their ways.
One solution (‘do what you currently say’ or ‘walk your current talk’) would
imply a so-called ‘combination-contract’ in which there is a ‘base’ level of
guaranteed pension payments and a remainder that is conditional on performance.13 A combination-contract, which involves both debt-like and
equity-like claims, would require solvency rules to force pension funds to
defend the guaranteed part of obligations through dynamic investment
policies reducing investment risks and interest-rate risks at low funding
rates.14 A second solution (‘say what you currently do’ or ‘talk about your
current walk’) would change the funds’ communicated liability structure by
communicating that all pension rights have become uncertain in a particular statistical sense.

Lack of economic valuation and fair pricing:
ambiguous property rights
Lack of economic valuation
Valuation of pension rights in the Netherlands is still based on an outdated
DB design, which opens the door for a non-transparent redistribution of
wealth across various stakeholders. In particular, pension rights are valued
as guaranteed nominal annuities, rather than variable annuities resulting
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from the funds’ investment policies in combination with the withdrawal of
external risk bearers. By contrast, an economic valuation of pension rights
would take into account the option value of individuals’ claims on collective
buffers. These conditional claims depend on the rules for distributing surpluses and funding shortages across stakeholders. Next we explain how the
lack of economic valuation (and thus fair pricing of pensions entitlements)
leads to ambiguity about ownership rights when the pension contract and
investment policies are changed, or if annuity units are bought and sold.

Incomplete pension fund policies
A necessary condition for determining the economic value of individual
property rights is that the pension contract must be complete, in the sense
that the rules for distributing risk are known in advance and are not subject
to discretionary changes. Yet most pension contracts do not offer transparency ex ante about the rules for allocating the mismatch risk on the balance
sheet of pension funds across stakeholders ex post. Although pension funds
have recently strived to make risk sharing contracts more complete, these
contracts usually offer little more than guidelines for the governing board.
Indeed, the pension governing boards still retain substantial discretion in
redistributing resources across stakeholders. For example, most contracts
tend to stay silent on what happens in the situation of a funding deﬁcit. It is
also unclear what happens if the buffers rise above the levels necessary to
fully ﬁnance indexed pensions. Discretionary decision-making by pension
fund boards may alter the value of individual annuities and thus redistribute
wealth positions across stakeholders, if the different variable annuities produced by a change in distributional rules or investment policy are not
exchanged at fair prices (see also Kocken 2012). This politicizes decisionmaking in pension funds.

Incomplete government policies
In addition to pension fund board discretion, the policies of the government
are another source of ambiguity about the distribution of risk and thus the
economic value of pension ownership rights. The Dutch government regularly adjusts the rules for pension funds and thereby alters how mismatch risk
is allocated across stakeholders. If the original and new variable annuities as a
result of a change in government policy are not exchanged at fair prices, the
government in effect redistributes economic value across participants.
The discount rate is particularly important in allocating the distribution
of resources across stakeholders, because it determines the ﬁnancial position of a pension fund. This in turn determines pension payments to
retirees in the short run, and also the resources remaining for pension
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payments in the long run. Starting in 2007, discounting was no longer based
on a ﬁxed discount rate of 4 percent but on the term structure of nominal
interest rates. This new discounting method caused the funding position to
be highly sensitive to changes in nominal interest rates. The low interest
rates during the Euro crisis led to proposals for a more stable discount rate.
The current valuation method is also controversial because it is still based on
guaranteed nominal annuities. Alternative valuation methods have been
proposed that aim to provide a better representation of the risk characteristics of the variable annuities that are actually being provided. A key property of these proposals is that they all embody reduced sensitivity to
ﬂuctuations in interest rates. Proponents of these alternative valuation
methods argue that ﬂuctuations in the risk-free rate are less relevant for
the valuation of variable annuities, so that the price of new annuities should
be less sensitive to time-variation in the market price of certainty as reﬂected
in interest rates of safe assets (SER 2013).
In 2012, the Dutch government adopted the so-called ‘Ultimate Forward
Rate’ (UFR) method for discounting liabilities with long maturities discussed in Solvency-II proposals. The introduction of UFR with ﬁxed annuity
units led to an instantaneous 3 percent increase in the funding rate of the
average Dutch pension fund. Improved ﬁnances have allowed the pension
funds to provide more indexation or reduce the size of required pension
cuts.15 Hence the introduction of the UFR methodology shows how adjustments in regulation can lead to redistribution of market value across stakeholders. Another example of an adjustment in government regulation is the
2008 temporary increase in the maximum number of years that pension
funds are allowed to be underfunded, from three to ﬁve years. Frequent
changes in the rules for computing and distributing mismatch risk have led
to intergenerational conﬂicts and politicized pensions.
To minimize political conﬂicts, the Dutch government has asked CPB (an
independent government body for economic policy analysis) on several occasions to calculate the redistributive effects between generations that result
from proposed changes in regulation (CPB 2012a, 2012b, 2013). CPB applied
generational accounting to calculate the change in the value of pension rights.
These calculations employ stochastic discounting of projected stochastic cash
ﬂows instead of valuation based on nominal guarantees.

Intergenerational conﬂict about investment policy due to asymmetric contract
A valuation based on guaranteed nominal annuities, which the pension
funds currently report, fails to recognize that the economic value of individual annuities depends on the pension fund’s investment policy. In particular, the relatively short recovery period of ﬁve years for a funding
shortfall implies that the downside risk associated with risk taking is
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allocated primarily to the older generations. The upward potential, by
contrast, is used to build up collective buffers, which primarily beneﬁt the
younger generations. With the old in effect providing a put option to the
young participants, an intergenerational conﬂict emerges about the investment proﬁle of the fund. The old will seek to hedge nominal interest rate
risk and reduce investment risk, the young will prefer to take more interest
rate and investment risk in order to increase the economic value of their
pension entitlements. Due to this asymmetry in the current pension contract (another legacy of the DB approach), in order to protect the value of
individual property rights, one should make the contract complete in terms
not only of distributional rules but also investment policy.

Non-transparent redistribution when selling and buying annuity units
The lack of fair pricing of annuity units due to inadequate valuation leads to
redistribution of wealth if annuity units are bought and sold. In particular,
failure to conduct economic valuation of pension rights implies that transfers of pension rights across funds may hurt either those who transfer the
rights or the remaining participants. This distorts decisions to transfer value
across funds. Moreover, since the price charged for new pension rights does
not reﬂect the economic value of these rights, the accumulation of new
pension entitlements by workers causes non-transparent redistribution
between retirees and inactive participants, on the one hand, and workers
who are accumulating new (deferred) annuities, on the other. This problem
has worsened due to another legacy of the DB schemes: a ﬁxed accrual rate
for newly accrued entitlements. A ﬁxed accrual rate implies that the economic costs of pension accruals vary over time as a result of ﬂuctuations in
the price of the annuity units. With fair prices, this system of a ﬁxed accrual
rate independent of the price of the accrued annuity units is pro-cyclical
because the price of annuity units tends to be high in recessions (with low
interest rates) and low in booms (with high interest rates). To prevent such
pro-cyclicality, the present Dutch system allows for smoothing of the price
over time but this leads to non-transparent redistribution between existing
participants and active workers. The pro-cyclicality could be mitigated without these value transfers, either by moving to a more stable discount rate (as
proposed by SER 2013) or by employing variable accrual rates that ﬂuctuate
inversely with the price of the annuity units.

Difﬁculties in introducing elements of individual choice
With risks increasingly being shifted onto participants, interest has grown in
giving individuals a greater say in how much risk they want to bear. However,
inadequate valuation hinders the introduction of more elements of
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individual choice, not only in risk proﬁles but also contribution levels. In
particular, individual choices will be distorted as a result of inadequate
valuation.16

Characteristics of DA Plans
The weaknesses of Dutch occupational DB plans, which became more
apparent in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, led to proposals to address
these weaknesses through the introduction of so-called DA schemes. In this
section we describe key features of DA plans, and also explore how these
schemes address the shortcomings of DB contracts, and protect the desirable features of traditional occupational schemes described.

Employer as distribution platform for annuities
rather than as risk sponsor
DA schemes are similar to DC plans in that they both lack outside risk
sponsors: mismatch risk on the fund balance sheet is borne by the
participants of the scheme rather than a corporate sponsor. Participants
can thus trade risk with outsiders only through tradable ﬁnancial instruments. This is in the interest of workers for two reasons: ﬁrst, workers are
not exposed to their employer’s or industry’s credit risk. This is an
important advantage because the expected lifetime of ﬁrms and industries is declining in the face of ever-more dynamic and competitive
economies. Second, by relieving ﬁrms of their role as risk sponsor,
workers keep ﬁrms involved as a distribution platform for occupational
pensions. In this way, employers can continue to help address the behavioral factors, agency issues, and the imperfections of insurance and
ﬁnancial markets identiﬁed above.

Pension entitlement as (deferred) annuity
Pension entitlements in the DA environment are deﬁned in terms of
deferred annuity units (i.e. lifetime income streams beginning at a particular retirement age). Conversion of capital into annuities occurs when contributions are paid, so participants share idiosyncratic longevity risk within
the fund’s insurance pool. DA schemes thus preserve the advantage of
current Dutch contracts in which collective risk-pooling combats selection
in longevity insurance.
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Risk sharing with complete contract in mutual insurer yields variable annuities
Participants in DA schemes also share the systematic risks associated with
joint asset and liability pools on the basis of complete contracts. In particular, if the value of the fund’s aggregate liabilities deviates from the value of
aggregate assets, the pension contract speciﬁes how annuity units will be
adjusted over time so that the aggregate value of individual pension rights
continues to match the value of the assets in the fund. The fund can thus be
viewed as a stand-alone mutual insurer: all risks within the collective are
allocated to plan members, so there is no residual balance sheet risk left to
outside shareholders or sponsors. Risk sharing within this fund thus results
in variable annuities: annuity units vary with ﬁnancial and biometric risks in
the common asset and liability pools.
Fund liabilities may also include other non-traded risk factors such as
(wage) inﬂation risk.17 In this way, participants hold claims on notional
assets that are not traded in ﬁnancial markets. DA contracts thus preserve
the beneﬁt of traditional collective occupational pension schemes, in that
they allow participants to exchange systematic risk factors which are not
externally traded.

Innovation in occupational pension schemes
The DA model with variable annuities also offers an innovation in the area
of funded occupational pension schemes, just as non-ﬁnancial deﬁned
contribution (NDC) schemes did for pay-as-you-go public schemes
(Holzmann et al. 2012). In particular, by replacing DB schemes where
corporate risk sponsors absorb risk, both NDC and DA schemes lack external risk sponsors; here, in fact, funding gaps do not affect contribution
levels. Both of these schemes allocate risk of joint asset and liability pools
across participants on the basis of complete contracts that specify how
liabilities must be adjusted if the value of aggregate assets deviates from
the value of aggregate liabilities.

Speciﬁc forms of risk sharing contracts
The mechanism for allocating mismatch risk in proposed Dutch DA contracts involves some speciﬁc features. First of all, the contract is symmetric,
so positive shocks in funding are allocated in the same way as are negative
shocks. Second, proportional adjustments of annuity units are uniform
across individuals, which imposes restrictions on participants’ risk exposure.
Annuities are all variable, varying with the ﬁnancial and biometric risk of the
common asset and liability pool. Third, income streams provided by the
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variable annuities are adjusted gradually after an unexpected shock causes a
mismatch between assets and liabilities. Accordingly, retirees do bear investment risk but they have some time to adjust their standards of living after an
unexpected event. Such smoothing of adjustment of consumption to shocks
is consistent with habit formation.

Communication and risk management on basis
of consumption frame
Pension rights are communicated not just in terms of capital, but also in
terms of the risk proﬁle of an income stream in retirement. In particular, the
pension contract speciﬁes how sensitive real income in retirement will be
with respect to the various risk factors. These risk proﬁles for each horizon
are the starting point for risk management (Figure 12.4), and specifying this
risk proﬁle is the main responsibility of the pension fund board. The fund’s
investment policy is then determined endogenously such that the risk
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Figure 12.4 Risk proﬁle of future real pension income in DA scheme
Note: The mean of real pension income is normalized to unity in this ﬁgure. The dotted and
dash-dotted lines illustrate real pension income in the 97.5 and 2.5 percentiles, respectively.
Source : Bovenberg et al. (2015).
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surrounding projected pension payments matches desired risk proﬁles. In
this way, the idea of liability-driven investment based on asset-liability management familiar from DB schemes is generalized to stochastic liabilities
with risk budgets. In this way, the contract is complete not only in terms of
the allocation of mismatch risk across participants, but also in terms of
investment policy, so that participants obtain the risk exposures that have
been communicated to them. Pension funds ‘walk their talk’: assets match
liabilities.18 The desired liabilities discipline the investment policy.
As a result of employing a consumption frame for risk management, interest
rate risk is actively managed during both the accumulation and payout phases.
In addition, contribution levels can be set so as to reach a particular goal for
retirement income. In this regard, we can distinguish between a DC scheme
which ﬁxes the premium, and a DA scheme which adjusts the premium level
so as to attain a particular objective for retirement income.

Economic valuation
Economic valuation of individual property rights over annuity units can be
derived endogenously from the stochastic pension promises (i.e. the pension ambitions), which represent the liabilities of the DA scheme. In particular, the deferred stochastic annuities provided by the DA scheme are
priced on the basis of the term structure of interest rates amended by a
horizon-dependent risk premium that rises with the investment horizon, as
illustrated in Figure 12.5 (see Bovenberg et al. 2015).
3.0

Percentage (%)

2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Horizon in Years
real riskfree rate
real riskfree rate increased with horizon-dependent risk premium

Figure 12.5 Horizon-dependent discount rate of a DA scheme
Source : Bovenberg et al. (2015).
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Non-traded risk factors in the common liability pool complicate valuation,
since the DA schemes cannot be valued objectively on the basis of prices in
ﬁnancial markets. This gives rise to a trade-off between completing ﬁnancial
markets versus being able to make an objective economic valuation. On the
one hand, these schemes allow participants to trade risk factors among
themselves that are not yet traded on ﬁnancial markets, thereby potentially
creating value. On the other hand, the prices of these risk factors are
difﬁcult to determine objectively, which may give rise to political risk.
The symmetric nature of the pension contract implies that the investment
policy of the fund does not affect the market value of individual pension
rights for given annuity units (see Bovenberg et al. 2015). The separation
between risk exposures and the value of the individual annuities allows
trustees to change the risk proﬁle of given annuity units without changing
their value. In this way, DA pension funds may be allowed more discretion to
modify risk proﬁles.
Proper valuation is needed to give participants some limited freedom of
choice in selecting their own risk proﬁles or saving levels. In particular, by
allowing participants to exchange various types of variable annuities at fair
prices, pension funds can provide individuals discretion in selecting their
own risk proﬁle and contribution level without imposing externalities on the
other participants of the fund.
Market-consistent valuation is also relevant for determining the prices for
buying and selling the annuities that do not impose externalities on existing
owners of annuity units. In particular, required pension contributions can
be derived endogenously from the stochastic pension promises (i.e. the
pension ambitions). This is reminiscent of traditional DB schemes in
which the pension contributions are determined on the basis of the guaranteed income stream during retirement. Similarly, the value of the variable
annuities can be determined in the DA context when individuals want
to transfer their pension rights to another pension fund.19 This avoids
distortions.
Economic valuation also helps protect property rights and generational
fairness when the risk sharing contract is changed. In particular, the value of
property rights should remain constant if a change in the pension contract
implies that participants may exchange one type of variable annuity for
another. Exchanging variable annuities at fair prices avoids mixing up a
change in the pension contract with intergenerational redistribution. This
condition of neutrality in market value in case of contract changes allows
one to value the contract on a market-consistent basis, even though the
contract is incomplete in the sense that it may be changed over time in the
face of new information. To illustrate, a single annuity may be transformed
into a joint-and-survivor annuity, leaving the total value of the pension right
unaffected. Another element that may be subject to change is the way in
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which discount rates and hence liabilities are computed. In particular, how
sensitive the discount rates should be to the nominal interest rate is a
controversial issue, and pension funds may differ in how they want to deﬁne
liabilities. By enforcing fair pricing when the deﬁnition of the liabilities
changes, supervisors can allow pension funds more discretion in how the
funds deﬁne liabilities.
It is debatable as to whether changes in the way discount rates are
computed should lead to intergenerational distribution. It could be argued
that changes in the discount-rate methodology set by the government, based
on advice from experts, should lead to similar intergenerational risk sharing
as when interest rates change (at given annuity units). To illustrate, a higher
assumed risk premium (at a given risk) raises expected future rates of return
and thus reduces the current cost of funding an uncertain future pension
with a given expectation. The pension contract thus allows generations to
share risk factors that are not traded on ﬁnancial markets (namely, the
subjective estimates of experts on the equity risk premium). But allowing
changes in the estimated risk premium to redistribute market value across
generations may well lead to intergenerational conﬂicts about the unobservable risk premium. Moreover, pension funds cannot hedge discretionary
changes in the assumed risk premium.

Current Status of Pension Reform in
the Netherlands
In the Dutch pension agreement of 2010, social partners (i.e. the unions
and the national association of employers) proposed moving towards DAtype contracts in occupational pensions. The goal was to allow pension
income to adapt to unexpected changes in life expectancy and returns on
ﬁnancial markets. In this way, unexpected biometric and ﬁnancial shocks
would be absorbed in pension rights (i.e. annuity units) rather than in
additional contributions from employers and workers. The move towards
DA contracts provided risk-bearing capital to the pension funds, given
employers’ withdrawal as external risk sponsors. The goal was to make the
new pension contracts transparent and complete, and to have pension funds
communicate the risks implied by the pension contract (including investment policies) to participants. As regards systematic longevity risk, it was
proposed that the eligibility age for the public pension and the accrual rate
in occupational pensions would both be linked to life expectancy. In particular, the average number of pension years for each generation would be
set equal to the average expected pension years for generations who started
to collect the public pension between 2000 and 2009.
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Government’s response
The Dutch government adopted the proposal to increase the retirement
age, implementing legislation in 2012 linking the eligibility age for the
public pension and the accrual rate for tax-privileged occupational pensions
to life expectancy. The eligibility age for the public pension will gradually
increase from 65 to 66 during the period 2013–19 and will be further
increased to 67 during 2020–3. After 2023, this age will be permanently
linked to longevity.
The proposals to move towards DA contracts in the funded pension pillar
are still under consideration. It is unclear whether the government will
adopt the full set of proposals for DA or whether it will only implement
rather small changes to current pension structures.20 Three main factors
complicate the actual implementation of a DA model and explain why the
government is reluctant to adopt DA schemes: namely transitional problems, disagreements about risk proﬁles, and intergenerational conﬂicts
about annuity valuation.
Regarding transitional problems, the proposal anticipated that the new
contracts would apply not only to newly accrued pension rights, but also to
existing pension rights. Yet this retrospective change in pension contracts
could be challenged in court. The Dutch government is reluctant to take on
these legal risks and is therefore unwilling to mandate a wholesale conversion to DA contracts. Instead, it advocates that a choice to retrospectively
change the pension contract would be the responsibility of the pension
funds, and many smaller pension funds fear possible legal risks, though
some larger sectoral funds seem willing to accept them.
Two factors complicate the conversion of existing ‘DB’ rights into ‘DA’
rights, and they make the outcome of court cases uncertain. First, individual
property rights under the current contracts cannot be valued objectively
because the contracts are incomplete. Among other things, the economic
value of pension rights depends on the portfolio mix because of the asymmetric nature of pension contracts. For this reason, it is not so clear who
would gain and who would lose from a transition to DA. Second, the risk
proﬁle under current contracts is ambiguous and not clearly speciﬁed, nor
has it been communicated ex ante. Accordingly, the extent to which the
move toward DA changes the risk proﬁle of pension entitlements is unclear.
If existing pension rights were interpreted as guarantees, then the move
towards DA contracts could be viewed as a debt-equity swap. But as
explained above, most pension funds do not match nominal liabilities in
their investment policy even though they lack external risk sponsors. For this
reason, nominal pension rights are in fact already risk-bearing.
The proposals for DA contracts have also led to heated discussions about
the desired risk proﬁle of pension payments. To illustrate, the extent to

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi

236

Reimagining Pensions

which pension funds should offer nominal guarantees is controversial. On
the one hand, some people argued that guarantees should not be provided,
because real guarantees cannot be purchased (the supply of safe inﬂationlinked bonds is very limited in the Euro area) and are too expensive,
especially for workers. On the other hand, some argued in favor of including
some form of nominal guarantee to offer some certainty, which also makes
the pension product easier to communicate. Moreover, the funds’ investment policy can also be better disciplined. Some proponents of the second
view denounced contracts without guarantees as ‘casino pensions.’ At the
same time, those who supported nominal guarantees were accused of
exploiting participants’ money illusions.
A third explanation for why DA plans have not yet been adopted has to do
with the combination of the subjective and unstable character of the contracts, and the legacy of the traditional DB mindset with ﬁxed annuity units.
In particular, fair pricing is difﬁcult to adopt when the contract (including
the discount methodology for computing liabilities) is changed, because
then the number of annuity units would have to change.21 With ﬁxed
annuity units, however, a change in the pension contract (including the
discounting methodology) results in redistribution of wealth across participants and therefore yields intergenerational conﬂicts. The experience of
the last couple of years shows that smoothing periods and discount rates are,
in fact, changed frequently. Some argued that economic valuation under
DA would reduce political risks, by increasing transparency about intergenerational redistribution associated with changes in the contract. Others, by
contrast, maintained that the discount methodology in DA contracts might
be changed even more frequently because the risk premium and expected
inﬂation in the discount rate are difﬁcult to estimate. For this reason, DA
contracts might give rise to even more intergenerational conﬂict than the
current DB contracts. Concerns about political risk intensiﬁed when the
social partners proposed employing the expected return on the portfolio of
pension funds as the discount rate for calculating pension liabilities. Critics
pointed out that using the expected return as discount rate would result in
intergenerational redistribution from older to younger participants, if pension funds were to raise their expected return by investing in riskier assets
while not raising the annuity units for young participants.
Market pricing of a variable annuity is hard to adopt because of the legacy
of DB thinking in terms of ﬁxed annuity units, not only when contracts are
changed but also if new annuity units are bought. Social partners seek to
maintain a ﬁxed annual accrual rate (in terms of annuity units) even though
they are unwilling to tolerate ﬂuctuations in the contribution rates as a
consequence of changes in the economic value of the annuity units. The
goals of stabilizing both accrual rates and contribution levels have led to
heated discussions about the interest sensitivity of the discount rate. The
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social partners argued that discount rates should be more stable than
nominal interest rates, to ensure that the interest sensitivity of contribution
rates does not affect the economy in a pro-cyclical fashion. The discounting
methodology debate together with an unwillingness to modify either the
ﬁxed accrual rate or annuity units when the discounting methodology is
changed has intensiﬁed concerns about political risks surrounding DA
contracts.

Companies are considering individual deﬁned
contribution
Other proposals for pension reforms look beyond DA and focus instead on
individual accounts in which entitlements are deﬁned in terms of claims on
tradable ﬁnancial assets without joint liability pools that are difﬁcult to value
(see PJO 2013 and WI CDA 2014). Several large companies who operate
their own pension funds have lost patience with the slow reform process,
and they are now considering a move towards individual DC schemes. Here,
entitlements would be deﬁned in terms of claims on tradable ﬁnancial assets
in the accumulation phase, while annuities will be provided in the payout
phase.22 These companies will continue to play a role as a distribution
platform, setting defaults and collectively contracting out a pool of insured
participants to the ﬁnancial service industry. Hence, these individual contribution schemes can retain a collective wrapping.
These individual DC schemes do not rely on ﬁxed accrual rates of
deferred annuities and thus they reconcile a ﬁxed contribution level with
the absence of external effects on the value of existing pension rights. Other
advantages are that property rights are deﬁned in terms of capital rather
than difﬁcult-to-value annuities. Hence DC plans are less subject to political
risk than are DA plans. Moreover, DC plans allow for more tailor-made risk
exposures because they are not constrained by a uniform deﬁnition of
liabilities along with the associated discounting methodology, including
the interest rate sensitivity of discounting, prescribed by the government
and uniform adjustments of annuity units.
The ﬁrms considering a move to a deﬁned contribution plan face three
obstacles. First, Dutch tax privileges for individual DC schemes are less
generous than those for schemes that deﬁne entitlements in terms of
deferred annuities. Second, the tax regime is modeled after the ﬁxed
accrual rate in DB schemes, which implies that the accrual of pension
beneﬁts is backloaded. Hence tax deductible contribution rates are low
for young workers and rise sharply with age. Third, legislation stipulates
that capital must be converted at retirement into a ﬁxed nominal annuity
bought from an insurance company, and guidelines require investment and
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interest rate risks to be shut down even prior to retirement. Together with
the relatively low contribution rates for young workers, this makes it difﬁcult
for workers to beneﬁt from the equity risk premium. These regulations also
expose workers to inﬂation risk. Regulatory changes to allow variable annuities for Dutch DC pensions are currently under consideration.

Lessons of DA for DC Schemes in the United States
This section explores the relevance of DA plans for mainstream DC schemes
in the United States.

‘Consumption frame’ during the accumulation phase
Traditional DC schemes can allow a more conservative portfolio when
retirement approaches. In doing so, these schemes recognize that taking
investment risk is more attractive for young workers than for older workers
and retirees. Nevertheless, they are typically based on a ‘capital frame,’
which fails to recognize the importance of interest rate management for
providing a stable lifetime income stream during retirement. Indeed, since
interest rates affect expected future returns, rational investors should
engage in intertemporal hedging. For this reason, DC risk management
could be improved if investments can be ‘liability-driven’ by adopting the
‘consumption frame’ of DA.
In DC plans, liabilities are used only to conduct individual asset-liability
risk management; unlike in DA, liability risks are not shared with others in a
mutual insurance framework. An advantage of the individual approach is
that one need not confront controversial valuation issues of joint liabilities
and the associated political risks (including changing the valuation methodology of the joint liabilities). A disadvantage of not sharing liability risks is
that individuals cannot share risks that are not traded on ﬁnancial markets.
If all risk factors determining the value of liabilities could be traded in
ﬁnancial markets, then a DC scheme that based its investment strategy on a
properly deﬁned individual liability could, in theory, mimic the risk exposures of a DA scheme that deﬁnes entitlements in terms of annuity units
purchased and sold on the basis of fair economic pricing. The practical
advantage of the DA model, however, is that the ‘consumption frame’ is
inherently integrated in its design because individual entitlements are
deﬁned in terms of annuity units, and thus income streams. This contrasts
with DC schemes which deﬁne entitlements in terms of capital, rather than a
consumption frame. As a result of this difference in framing, DA schemes
typically feature more advanced risk management with more intertemporal
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hedging. A disadvantage of the ‘consumption frame’ in DA schemes, however, is that the economic value of individual entitlements may be less well
protected in DA schemes than in DC schemes, in which property rights are
based on easy-to-value ﬁnancial assets and thus do not involve controversial
valuation methods. In theory, redistributing wealth across individuals can be
ruled out in a DA contract if fair pricing were applied in the event that
contracts are changed, including the valuation methodology of the joint
liabilities. In practice, however, individual ownership rights may be subject
to political risk because annuity units may not be adjusted when contracts
are changed.
Managing interest rate risk is complicated for three reasons. First, during
the accumulation phase, an investor may not yet know which fraction of
wealth he intends to use to buy an annuity (as opposed to a lump-sum
payment), and what the desired risk proﬁle of the income stream will be
(nominal or real, guaranteed or variable). In this case, it may not be clear
which ‘liability’ needs to be hedged during the accumulation phase. Second,
if one continued to take investment risk during retirement, the assumed
relationship between interest rates and expected returns on risky investments becomes relevant for intertemporal hedging demands. Yet this relationship is difﬁcult to estimate and is subject to substantial model risk. Third,
if the aim is to provide an income stream linked to wage inﬂation in the
absence of wage inﬂation-linked bonds, then the optimal intertemporal
hedging strategy in terms of hedging nominal interest rate risk depends
on whether one believes that changes in nominal interest rates are driven
primarily by changes in real interest rates or by changes in expectations
about wage inﬂation.
Communication in mainstream DC schemes is typically based on the
accumulated wealth (the ‘capital frame’) rather than in terms of a future
income stream. Nevertheless, communication in terms of income streams
can improve people’s understanding of their ﬁnancial situation, particularly
when it provides information on the uncertainty and purchasing power of
future consumption streams.23

Dealing with longevity risk
Annuitization of pension wealth is mandatory in the Dutch second pillar,
as well as for individual DC schemes. The level of annuitization in the
United States, by contrast, is relatively low: few retirees voluntarily annuitize their retirement savings. Rational models of risk-averse consumers have
difﬁculty explaining limited annuity demand in view of the potential for
mortality credits (especially at the end of life) to reduce the costs of
lifetime income. The DA consumption frame may help boost the demand
for annuities. In particular, Brown et al. (2008) show that people value
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annuities more highly in a consumption frame. In a capital frame, by
contrast, annuities are seen as a risky asset because the payoff depends
on one’s uncertain lifespan. Moreover, annuities can help reduce the costs
of means-tested public healthcare because they protect individuals from
running out of money at the end of life, when people tend to need care
(Peijnenburg et al. 2010).
Individual pension plans also must deal with macro longevity risk. When
annuities are bought for the payout phase, systematic longevity risk can be
(re)insured by an insurance company. One disadvantage of this solution is
default risk of the insurer. Insurance also tends to be costly due to required
solvency buffers in the absence of a natural hedge against macro longevity
risk.24 An alternative solution, which does not require insurance by a third
party, is mutual insurance with collectively owned solvency buffers for the
purpose of absorbing unexpected shocks in longevity. Examples of mutual
insurance companies offering ﬁxed annuities include TIAA in the US and
mutual insurers in Scandinavia. A disadvantage of this form of mutual
insurance is that the prices for insurance and the property rights of the
mutually owned buffer are not well deﬁned, which may give rise to nontransparent redistribution of wealth within the mutual across various parties.
Moreover, younger participants may have to bear substantial longevity risk
due to mutual insurers having a large number of old participants that must
be shielded from systematic longevity risk.
A DA solution for sharing macro longevity risk within a joint liability pool
can provide an attractive alternative. Indeed, DA resembles the CREF annuity scheme in the United States, which adjusts the annuity units of its retired
participants in response to longevity shocks (including changes in projected
mortality). CREF differs from DA in that unexpected shocks are not
smoothed but immediately absorbed in payouts. In view of habit formation,
a smoothing procedure in the spirit of DA may be more attractive because it
results in gradual adjustment of income streams.
A DA solution with joint liabilities to deal with systematic longevity risk can
be restricted to the payout phase. This limits difﬁcult valuation issues, as well
as the associated political risks and potential intergenerational conﬂicts, in
the face of substantial uncertainty regarding future retiree mortality. Moreover, workers can absorb changes in remaining life expectancy by working
to a later age, whereas retirees cannot. Hence it does not seem to make
sense to have retired generations share in workers’ systematic longevity risks.
One might even want to restrict sharing the risks of joint liabilities to only
the oldest cohorts (e.g. cohorts of age 75 and older). In this way, capital
is not completely converted into annuity units at the retirement age, and
until the age of full annuitization, retirement income comes in part from
capital.25 Indeed, longevity insurance is most valuable at old ages when
mortality credits are substantial (Scott 2008).
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Workers can also insure the macro longevity risk of older participants in
the annuity pool if their capital has not been converted to an annuity. This
form of intergenerational risk trading may be welfare-improving because
workers can exploit their remaining human capital to absorb shocks (Bodie
et al. 1992). A disadvantage is that the risk premium workers require to take
on longevity risk of the oldest cohorts is not observable in ﬁnancial markets
and therefore may give rise to intergenerational conﬂicts.
Heterogeneity in terms of life expectancy within cohorts can lead to
intra-generational transfers in collective pools that insure longevity risk at
uniform prices: for example, transfers from men to women, or from low
earners to high earners. If some forms of redistribution between groups
with different mortality rates were to be considered undesirable, these
could be ruled out by differentiating prices for annuities based on
observed heterogeneity in life expectancy or by forming homogeneous
pools. If such transfers were deemed desirable, by contrast, one could
employ risk-equalization schemes to reconcile solidarity between groups
with free entry in insurance pools.

Variable annuities: smoothing investment risk
Most annuities purchased from accumulated wealth in individual DC
schemes currently take the form of guaranteed lifelong income streams.
The conversion of wealth into an annuity thus prevents the annuitant from
taking advantage of risk premiums. DA schemes, by contrast, allow participants to continue taking investment risk after annuitization. Gradual
adjustments after unexpected investment shocks protect retirees from
large discrete changes in their consumption levels. Smoothing of shocks
in effect leads to life cycle investments beyond the moment of retirement:
investment risk is gradually reduced after the retirement age.26 Smoothing
and the associated life cycle investment distinguish DA from most variable
annuities in the United States, including the CREF annuities already
referred to.

Role of the employer to deal with behavioral
and market imperfections
By discharging employers from their role as risk sponsor, DA makes it more
attractive for employers to continue to play a role as a distributional
platform for occupational pensions. In this way, employers help address
(1) behavioral imperfections by setting defaults; (2) agency issues in ﬁnancial markets by collective procurement of ﬁnancial services from commercial
suppliers; and (3) selection in insurance by pooling longevity risks.
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Conclusion: Are DA Schemes Suitable
for the United States?
This chapter has explored the strengths and weaknesses of DA pension
schemes. In overview, four features of DA hold promise for the United States.
First, the consumption frame used by DA schemes can improve communication and risk management compared to DC schemes. Communication in
terms of lifetime income streams may assist individuals to better understand
their ﬁnancial situations. Among other things, it may boost the demand for
annuities. Regarding risk management, viewing income streams as liabilities
encourages ﬁnancial providers to engage in better intertemporal hedging.
Second, the DA model addresses systematic longevity risk in annuity
provision through risk sharing within a joint liability pool. Collective risk
sharing does not suffer from the drawbacks of external insurance (i.e.
default risk and costly solvency buffers) or mutual insurance with collective
buffers (i.e. non-transparent ownership).
Third, the DA approach allows retirees to continue to beneﬁt from risk
premiums without being subject to large discrete ﬂuctuations in consumption, because of the smoothing mechanism that leads to a continuation of
life cycle investment throughout retirement. This design for variable annuities reconciles insurance of idiosyncratic longevity risk with taking investment risk.
Fourth, DA schemes allow employers to play an important role in addressing behavioral imperfections, agency issues, and imperfections of insurance
and ﬁnancial markets.
Collective DA plans with joint liabilities may be especially useful during the
payout phase for DC schemes. To limit valuation problems, risk sharing of joint
liabilities could be limited to the oldest group (e.g. 75 years and older) only.
DA schemes may also be attractive for DB schemes in the public sector, as
the latter must reduce risks and costs to taxpayers. Nevertheless, risk sharing
with a common liability pool of retirees and workers can lead to intergenerational conﬂicts about the contract. Additionally, choosing the discount
methodology for valuing joint liabilities can be contentious if annuities are
not priced and exchanged fairly in the event the contract is changed or
when the annuities are bought. In any case, the current underfunding of
public sector pension funds in the US must be addressed. Framing entitlements as annuity units results in volatile contributions, unless accruals move
inversely with the price of the variable annuities. Moreover, the DA model
does not allow for sufﬁcient tailor-made risk management if adjustments of
annuity units are uniform across cohorts. For instance, asking retired
cohorts to share the longevity risk of the working generations is probably
not optimal. Accordingly, a DA plan can be attractive for the payout phase
but it holds promise for the accumulation phase only if annuity units are
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priced fairly, beneﬁt accrual varies with the price of the annuity units, and
risk exposure of the annuity units can differ across cohorts.
In sum, for the US, a hybrid solution may be attractive. This would employ
a DC frame (deﬁning entitlements in terms of capital) during the accumulation phase and a DA frame (deﬁning entitlements in terms of annuity
units) during the payout phase. Such a hybrid combines the strengths of
individual DC, including individual ownership, actuarially neutral pension
accruals, and scope for tailor-made risk management and individual choice,
with the strengths of DA, namely insurance of idiosyncratic longevity risk,
sharing of systematic longevity risk, and utilization of the employer as a
platform for addressing behavioral and market imperfections.

Endnotes
1. The analysis in this chapter is descriptive in nature; for a theoretical treatment, see
Bovenberg et al. (2015), who formalize DA schemes, including the market valuation of variable annuities provided by these schemes.
2. In terms of active participants, the other most important type of pension fund is a
company pension fund. To provide pension beneﬁts to its workers, a company
does not have to set up its own company pension fund but can also contract out its
pension scheme to an insurance company.
3. The combination of uniform accrual and a uniform contribution rate in industry
funds implies that occupational pensions are in effect ﬁnanced in part on a payas-you-go basis, as younger workers subsidize older workers. CPB (2014) estimates
that the implicit debt, due to the backloading of beneﬁts is approximately 10
percent of total assets.
4. Several Dutch pension funds had to cut pensions in payments in nominal terms in
Apr. 2013.
5. This valuation method was amended in 2012 with the Ultimate Forward Rate
(UFR) methodology to determine discount rates beyond a horizon of 20 years.
6. In principle, one could share ﬁnancial market shocks not only between currently
living generations but also with generations not yet participating in the pension
scheme. From an ex-ante point of view, this intergenerational trade is actually
welfare-improving. In practice, however, the scope for such risk sharing is limited
by the ability to commit generations to the contract (see Bovenberg and Mehlkopf
2013). As a result, the welfare gain associated with risk sharing with future participants
is rather limited in Dutch occupational pension schemes (see Boelaars et al. 2014).
7. Nominal liabilities in Figure 12.2 are calculated on the basis of the term structure
of interest rates, also before 2007 when pension funds in fact still employed a ﬁxed
discount rate of 4 percent to compute their liabilities.
8. They do, however, prohibit funds that face a nominal funding shortage taking
more mismatch risk.
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9. These numbers include some double-counting for people who have pension
entitlements in more than one pension fund, for example, people who are active
participants in one pension fund and who are inactive participants in another
pension fund (i.e. people who did not transfer their pension wealth when
moving to another company or sector).
10. The wave of pension cuts in 2014 is smaller compared to the year before: 29
pension funds are required to cut pensions. The cuts in 2014 affect around
200,000 retirees, 300,000 active participants, and 600,000 participants who neither pay contributions nor receive beneﬁts. The size of cuts is on average 1.3
percent.
11. The government has announced that, starting in 2015, pension funds should
communicate to individual participants projected pension incomes in real terms
for both the median outcome and a ‘bad weather’ scenario.
12. The recent cuts in nominal pension rights in 2013 and 2014 were not measured
in this survey, and they are likely to have resulted in a further decline in
conﬁdence levels.
13. At current asset levels and interest rates, nominal guarantees would have to be
lower than current pension rights if pension funds would maintain enough
upward potential for indexing pension rights to (wage) inﬂation. Such a ‘debtequity swap’ would especially necessary for (younger) workers.
14. Ambachtsheer (2013) contains a proposal for the introduction of a two-fund
solution in the Netherlands that is based on a similar idea. In Ambachsheer’s
proposal, young participants start accumulating wealth in a return-seeking
mutual fund with a long investment horizon and gradually convert their wealth
into an annuity fund during the life cycle.
15. This wealth transfer from workers to retirees through pension payments is
partially offset by the impact of the discount rate on the contributions that
workers have to pay for new accruals (CPB 2012b).
16. Individual choice in contribution levels is distorted also by the combination of
backloading of pension beneﬁts in combination with the uniform pricing of
annuities.
17. The supply of inﬂation-linked bonds is limited in the Euro area. Moreover, these
bonds use Euro inﬂation rather than Dutch price inﬂation used by pension funds.
18. Even though assets match liabilities ex ante, liabilities may diverge from assets ex
post because liabilities are stochastic. Hence, mismatch risk is zero ex post only if
liabilities are guaranteed (i.e. non-stochastic).
19. In the present Dutch context, transferring pension rights between pension funds
is possible only if workers change jobs. Market valuation, however, would in
principle allow workers to select their own pension fund, and hence would
allow more competition in pension provision. Drawbacks of this freedom of
choice between pension providers are additional transaction and marketing
costs as well as less scope for pension funds to beneﬁt from liquidity premiums
by investing in illiquid assets.
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20. These changes would be aimed at making cuts in nominal annuities after adverse
shocks in a more gradual way, in order to prevent large abrupt cuts in pensions
during economic downturns.
21. In the payout phase, one could smooth the adjustment in the annuity units to
prevent large discrete changes in income levels.
22. These companies are inclined to close the DB fund for new entrants without
converting existing rights.
23. This typically requires subjective assumptions about expectations and volatilities
of future returns (to calculate future asset values) as well as inﬂation (to calculate
future liabilities). Hence, model risk complicates communication in terms of
uncertainty and purchasing power.
24. A more attractive solution may be that the government could issue longevity
bonds to cover the tail risk of mortality for the very oldest cohorts, especially if
longevity risk on the government balance sheet is limited because the eligibility
age for public pension beneﬁts is linked to longevity.
25. To avoid selection issues, one may want to buy the lifetime income stream after age
75 already at age 65. Risk sharing within a single cohort (i.e. generational accounts
or ‘tontine’) may also be possible in large pension funds, but may be problematic
at high ages (when the number of surviving participants is small) and the insurance pool is no longer large enough for the ‘law of large numbers’ to hold.
26. Life cycle investment can alternatively be organized as an escalating annuity that
provides nominal guarantees and uses risky investments to provide conditional
cost-of-living adjustments (van Bilsen et al. 2013). These solutions do not rebalance equities and risk-free bonds after a negative investment shock. An advantage of these schemes is that nominal income never declines on account of
investment risk. A disadvantage is that expected bonuses may fall short of
expected inﬂation after an adverse shock.
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